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Thomistic Hylomorphism, Self-Determination, 
Neuroplasticity, and Grace: The Case of Addiction
Daniel D. De Haan
Abstract: This paper presents a Thomistic analysis of addiction that incorporates 
scientific, philosophical, and theological features of addiction. I will argue first, 
that a Thomistic hylomorphic anthropology provides a cogent explanation of the 
causal interactions between human action and neuroplasticity. I will employ Karol 
Wojtyła’s account of self-determination to further clarify the kind of neuroplasticity 
involved in addiction. Next, I will elucidate how a Thomistic anthropology can 
accommodate, without reductionism, both the neurophysiological and psychologi-
cal elements of addiction, and finally, I will make clear how Thomism can provide 
an ethics and a theology of grace that can be integrated with these ontological and 
scientific considerations into a holistic theory of addiction.
“Psychological motives and bodily occasions may overlap 
because there is not a single impulse in a living body which is 
entirely fortuitous in relation to psychic intentions, not a single 
mental act which has not found at least its germ or its general 
outline in physiological tendencies”1
—Maurice Merleau-Ponty
The theme of this year’s ACPA conference, “Science, Reason, and Re-ligion” provides an opportunity to engage a problem which demands an integrated answer, that is, an answer which requires a consideration 
of what science, philosophy, and religion can contribute to a particular problem. 
Addiction is just this sort of problem. This paper will adopt a unified psychosomatic 
approach to addiction and will attempt to articulate some of the diverse ways in 
which addictions involve neurological, psychological, moral, and spiritual aspects 
of the human person.2 This holistic approach to addiction in terms of science, 
philosophy, and theology will be developed within the context of a Thomistic 
philosophical anthropology.
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This paper will argue that a Thomistic hylomorphic anthropology provides 
a cogent explanation of the causal interactions between human action and neuro-
plasticity, can accommodate, without reductionism, both the neurophysiological 
and psychological elements of addiction, and is also able to show how ethics and 
a theology of grace can be integrated along with these ontological and scientific 
considerations into a holistic theory of addiction. This is an ambitious task for such 
a short space, and so many important details have been omitted for the sake of a 
holistic and unified account of addiction.
The paper is divided into four parts. The first part of this paper will show 
how a Thomistic doctrine of self-determination applies beyond the order of the 
psychological and can account for various alterations of our neurophysiology. We 
argue that by acting, persons not only become psychically inclined to good or evil 
activities, they also become physiologically ordered to these activities. This is because, 
on a hylomorphic view of man, a human person can be psychosomatically altered 
through acts of self-determination. In the second section we will contend that some 
instances of neuroplasticity are the neurophysiological results of human action as 
self-determination, which is made especially clear in the case of addictions. In short, 
addiction provides a clear case of what happens to the nervous system and psycho-
logical faculties of a human person who partakes in acts that are often deprived of 
moral goodness. The results are the numerous psychosomatic operational privations 
that are acquired by the addicted person. In the third part we will provide a holistic 
account of addiction within a Thomistic anthropology. We will present a sketch 
of how Thomism can provide a robust descriptive and explanatory philosophical 
anthropology that can give unity and clarity to the numerous ways that addictions 
introduce different operational privations within the human person. After suggesting 
a few of the ways in which addictions can be treated through pharmacology, moral 
formation and the solidarity of community, the final part of this paper will address 
the role that grace can play in the life of an addict.
I. Self-Determination and Thomistic Philosophical Anthropology
Thomism is committed to the incarnate dimension of the person as a psy-
chosomatic hylomorphic unity. The intellectual soul is the substantial form of the 
organic body with the potentiality for life. But to what degree do the accidental 
formal determinations of human action really alter our material substrate? A central 
topic in Karol Wojtyła’s The Acting Person is the nature of self-determination.3 The 
horizontal transcendence proper to the intentionality of conscious voluntary human 
action is well established in the Thomistic tradition. Consciously acting is always 
oriented towards some object; human persons transcend their own subjectivity in 
virtue of such intentional objects. In the Acting Person, Wojtyła seeks to emphasize 
and articulate more clearly the nature of vertical transcendence as well.4 Through 
the efficacy of the will, the person transcends the natural determinations of the 
physical order and becomes the sort of person who chooses and performs certain 
axiologically specified activities. In acting, the person is self-determining. A person 
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is able to determine himself because he is able to act beyond the determinations 
of nature and become responsible for the activities he wills. One becomes good by 
doing good, and one becomes evil by doing evil.
The engagement in freedom is objectified—because of its lastingly repeti-
tive effects, and conformably to the structure of self-determination—in 
the person and not only in the action, which is the transitive effect. It 
is in the modality of morality that this objectification becomes clearly 
apparent, when through an action that is either morally good or morally 
bad, man, as the person, himself becomes either morally good or mor-
ally evil. . . .  [H]uman actions once performed do not vanish without a 
trace: they leave their moral value, which constitutes an objective reality 
intrinsically cohesive with the person, and thus a reality also profoundly 
subjective. Being a person, man is “somebody,” and being somebody, he 
may be either good or bad.5
The axiological character of the objects and activities that we determine ourselves 
to become through the efficacy of our free choices make us into what we are. But in 
what way do we become the activities we choose? How far down does the psychoso-
matic integration of the person through self-determination extend? Obviously there 
is a determination of the human person at the spiritual, moral and psychological 
order, but what about the body? Is it really reasonable to suppose that through our 
ordinary acts of free choice we are not only laying down tracks of a psychological 
character, but also of a physiological character?
It seems that anyone committed to a Thomistic anthropology must take seri-
ously the penetrating dynamism of human action, that is, the transformative efficacy 
of self-determination that occurs in a human person who is consciously acting.6 This 
integrated dynamism of the whole person finds its core in the Thomistic doctrine 
of the existential unification of form and matter as well as accidents and subject 
within the essential order of being.7
“To be” is to be cause, that is, both immanent cause of its own being and 
transitive cause of other beings through efficient causality. Matter itself 
is no longer here as a mere obstacle, blindly aspiring to form; it is also 
a help. Actively engaged in it, the soul is giving itself the body which it 
needs; it progressively builds it up through physiological operations which 
pave the way for intellectual operations.8
If our accidental acts did not formally alter and determine our substance, that is 
both our form and matter, then there would be a real vitiation of the hylomorphic 
unity of the person. All moral acts would involve nothing more than a purely formal 
alteration of the spiritual and psychic order of man. Such a thesis has more in com-
mon with dualism than Thomism. The human person in Aquinas’s anthropology 
is an almost completely integrated form and matter composite substance. That is, 
we are psychically incarnate, and all of our psychological activities—except acts 
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that essentially occur without matter and so have their being entirely separate from 
matter—have some physiological substrate and manifestation.9
But if this is true, then we should expect to find some manifestation of formal 
determinations within the material substrate. Indeed we do. Disciplined activities 
(intentionally and unintentionally developed dispositions and habitus) bestow pro-
ficiency and increased capacities at both the physiological and psychological levels. 
Those who exercise various muscle groups gain superior endurance, flexibility and 
dexterity in these muscles. Various activities can also heighten our sensory attention 
to the more subtle details present in different sensibilia, for instance, in musicians 
with audition and sommeliers in olfaction and gustation. These are all putative 
instances of psychosomatic sensory plasticity, that is, cases of physiological develop-
ment or deterioration as the result of decisions to participate or not in various sorts 
of activities that involve the adaptation of our peripheral as well as of our central 
nervous system. But what provides our brain with the efficacy and formal unity to 
adapt in these ways? Do our self-determining human acts also significantly alter 
central features of our neurophysiology?
Addictions suggest an interesting case because they do not appear to fall clearly 
on the side of free choice or neuro-chemically determined compulsive behavior. It 
seems obvious in the majority of cases that addictions are initiated by non-compulsive 
decisions, yet they seem to result in motivations and cravings that undermine the 
person’s ability to rationally deliberate and freely decide how to act. Addiction in-
volves a kind of dialectic between initially voluntary choices and the whittling down 
of free choice to apparently compulsive behavior, which in extreme cases can even 
undermine choice. Even after years of treatment and abstinence, why is it that many 
“former” addicts can relapse following an encounter with a single evocative cue?10 The 
choices we make that bring about our addictions to various activities or substances 
do alter us in very significant psychosomatic ways, but it is not entirely clear how this 
should be understood. If it is merely a matter of choice, why are addictive activities 
so difficult to avoid and overcome? The addict no longer appears to be in control 
of their behavior. This is why many theorists on addiction are inclined to conclude 
that for many addicts the causal gravity has shifted entirely to the central nervous 
system. On such an account, the person is no longer a causal actor; the brain alone 
seems to be the causal origin of the addict’s behavior. But this cannot be the whole 
story. How is the nervous system so altered? Addictive behavior is acquired; it is 
not native to human persons from birth, let alone to their nervous system. We are 
not born with addictions to Internet browsing, pornography, drugs or gambling. 
Just as there are psychic alterations, there also seem to be some adaptations in the 
nervous system because and in response to the activities and decisions of the person.11
What we have articulated thus far should suggest the importance of the 
metaphysical axiom: an object is received into a recipient according to the mode 
of the recipient.12 For instance, human action not only inculcates the inclinations 
of our practical reason and will; it also affects the inclinations of our emotions 
with respect to the objects of our actions. Our self-determining activities instill 
within our psychological faculties dispositions or habitus that lead to disciplines 
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and virtues or vices in our concupiscible and irascible powers.13 Furthermore, on 
the physiological dimension, just as on the psychological dimension, these human 
actions of self-determination are received into the underlying material substrate of 
these powers, and there follows the alteration of various neural networks. In the 
next section we will clarify the nature of these neurological adaptations by turning 
to the phenomenon of neuroplasticity.
II. Neuroplasticity, Hylomorphism, and Addiction
We have just presented a number of theses about the nature of self-determina-
tion in human persons and argued that, even in cases of addictive human behavior, 
human action alters significant features of the whole person as a hylomorphic en-
tity, including the brain. In this section of the paper we will examine the empirical 
evidence on neuroplasticity, which, we argue, supports our claims about hylomor-
phism and self-determination, and is also resistant to reductionistic interpretations, 
especially in the case of addiction.
Our nervous system’s capacity to be altered in virtue of human experience 
through actions and activations results in various neurophysiological adaptations. 
This phenomenon is commonly referred to as neuroplasticity or Hebbian learning, 
named after Donald Hebb, one of the earliest theorists on neurological adapta-
tion. His theory is summarized in the often-quoted paraphrase, “neurons that fire 
together, wire together.”14 In what follows I will briefly summarize a number of the 
characteristics of neuroplasticity as it is presented by contemporary neuroscientists.
Empirical evidence has shown that the central and peripheral nervous system 
is able to adapt, not only to endogenous stimulation, but also to the exogenous 
stimulations of ordinary human experiences and behaviors. Early studies in the 
neurophysiology undergirding memory, such as inquiries about the hippocampus, 
motivated theoretical postulates about neural adaptation. Not only has this been 
confirmed, but numerous empirical investigations have also discovered other kinds 
of neural adaptation. The field of research dedicated to neuroplasticity has focused 
on uncovering the electrochemical mechanisms that underlie the transformative 
abilities of our nervous system to respond to experience. Neuroplasticity is found in 
such phenomena as the strengthening and growth of synaptic connections and the 
genesis of new neurons.15 Furthermore, in some experimental cases with primates 
and ferrets, neuroscientists have even discovered rather surprising instances of corti-
cal substitutions.16 In short, the brain is not an isolated, predetermined structure; it 
is significantly altered by a myriad of extra-neural stimuli that determine the brain 
in a variety of different ways.
Empirical research on neuroplasticity is, like neuroscience itself, still very much 
in its infancy. The majority of positive empirical confirmations for studies on hu-
man beings are limited, although there is a considerable amount of evidence drawn 
from other mammalian brains.17 Some neuroscientists have postulated that certain 
mechanisms of plasticity might be ubiquitous to the nervous system in all mam-
mals.18 What is especially significant for the purposes of our hylomorphic proposal 
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are the interlocking schemes of recurrence and inter-organizational manifestations 
of plasticity found within the biological hierarchical of any animal.
Given the  . . .  mutuality of feedback between levels, alterations at the 
genetic level can ultimately propagate up to the behavioral level. . . .  In 
the same way, responses to the sensory environment and experience can 
percolate back down through the various levels to impact ultimately on the 
genetic level, leading, potentially, to changes in gene expression. . . .  [E]ach 
level is acted upon directly by those above and below, and indirectly by all 
the others. This is true even at the two ends of the continuum, at both the 
gene and the behavioral level: the gene level is affected by the molecular/
synapse level above it in the web, and by free radicals, toxins, radiation, 
and other energies at the ‘extra’-gene level. By the same token, the behav-
ioral level is directly affected by the whole [central nervous system] level 
below and the effects of the environment above. Since the whole system 
is nested, in some sense behavioral and environmental events must make 
their ways down through the levels to the genome  . . .  to affect genetic 
expression in at least some fraction of genes, perhaps as a function of age.19
Thomas Aquinas would not be surprised to see such a manifest instance of his 
favorite hylomorphically interpreted Dionysian principle.20 There is a form matter 
causal order found within any physical hierarchy. The activities of the highest in a 
lower genus will be ordered to the formal principle that is lowest in the immediately 
higher genus. The neural substrate of our psychological faculties materially condi-
tions the potential range of formal activities carried out by our faculties. But these 
activities also formally determine the whole central nervous system as the substrate 
these activities organize and pattern. By seeing, perceiving, desiring and acting 
towards some object, our psychic faculties cooperatively enlist the coordination 
and integration of different neural systems, e.g., the visual cortex, limbic system, 
sensorimotor cortex, etc. These latter systems are nested within networks of plastic 
neural circuitry that are variably patterned by the variable patterning of intramodal 
and intermodal systems interactions. “Interactions within a neural circuit also include 
cell to cell feedforward and feedback excitation and inhibition, lateral inhibition, 
etc. Alterations in the activity of any neuron in the circuit impacts circuit activ-
ity as a whole and, as a result, the activity of other component neurons.”21 These 
interlocking patterns of formally ordering and materially ordered causal principles 
continue to cascade down beyond the neuronal level to synaptic, genetic, molecular 
and further chemical and physical levels of interaction.22
We have just offered a brief account of how the phenomenon of neuroplasticity 
relates to hylomorphism. Let us now turn to the problem of how addiction fits into 
our account of human self-determination and neuroplasticity.
Among the different fields of neurophysiological inquiry, neuroscientists have 
dedicated a great deal of research into the mechanisms of neuroplasticity involved in 
drug addictions. Addiction, like memory, is a clear instance of acquired capacities 
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or appetites, and so offers promising avenues for investigating neuroplasticity.23 The 
evidence in support of neuroplasticity in the case of drug addictions is extensive. 
It has been shown that “Addictive drugs induce long-term neuroadaptations at the 
structural, cellular, molecular, and genomic levels.”24
Empirical evidence has even recently challenged the predominant theoretical 
position that addiction is essentially a brain disease.25 The problem with the brain 
disease theory is that the reward centers of the brain that are stimulated and modi-
fied through prolonged uses of addictive substances function in many of the same 
ways as reward centers function for all other pleasurable activities. The neural genesis 
and plasticity that takes place in response to a person who regularly participates 
in pleasurable activities like exercise, eating and drinking, reading, sex, gambling, 
shopping, browsing the internet, etc. is often indiscernible in kind from the similar 
phenomena found in substance addictions.26 Such evidence goes a long way in 
supporting both that there are similar neurophysiological mechanisms involved in 
non-substance addictions (like pornography, gambling and video games), and that 
addictions must be approached in a holistic way that recognizes various addictions 
as phenomena that are not reducible to the brain.
Despite the fact that such evidence suggests that more is involved in neuro-
plasticity than the internal electrochemistry of the brain, many thinkers continue to 
interpret the phenomenon of neuroplasticity in a reductionist way. Joseph LeDoux 
concludes his impressive study on the synaptic self with the astonishingly reduction-
ist assertion: “You are your synapses. They are who you are.”27 Of course, there are 
exceptions to this reductionist interpretation of neuroplasticity. Richard Davidson, 
of the Laboratory for Affective Neuroscience, has stated otherwise:
[T]he fact of biological differences among individuals says nothing about 
the origins of those differences. A large corpus of neuroscience research 
over the past decade has underscored the importance of experiential 
determinants of the structure and function of the circuitry that has been 
featured here. Social influences on brain structure, activation patterns, 
neurogenesis, and even gene expression have all been demonstrated.  . . .  
Although heritable influences surely occur, environmental influences, par-
ticularly when they occur repetitively over time, can be extremely powerful 
and produce lasting changes in the brain. The fact that such experiential 
influences occur provides an impetus for the development of neurally 
inspired training programs to transform dysfunctional affective styles 
into ones that may be more adaptive. . . .  This is only a promissory note 
at the present time and requires much additional study and validation.28
It is surprising that those manifestations of neuroplasticity that occur as the 
result of addictive behaviors could be interpreted in any other way.29 But this is a 
not a recent philosophical mistake. And since the reductionistic objections have 
remained largely the same over the more than two thousand years of philosophical 
history, it is not surprising that the response of Socrates is still as formidable as any.
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If someone said that without bones and sinews and all such things, I 
should not be able to do what I decided, he would be right, but surely to 
say that they are the cause of what I do, and not that I have chosen the 
best course, even though I act with my mind, is to speak very lazily and 
carelessly. Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause from that 
without which the cause would not be able to act as a cause. It is what 
the majority appear to do, like people groping in the dark; they call it a 
cause, thus giving it a name that does not belong to it.30
Substituting the more known with the less known remains the spirit of ma-
terialism. Such thinkers continue to refuse to be informed by the insights found 
outside the caverns of the cranium. We should instead take seriously the advice that 
was given to us by Socrates in his last attempt to bring us outside the labyrinth of 
philosophical perplexity about the soul. I hope to show that our efforts at neuro-
spelunking will not be in vain if we also allow our inquiries to be conducted under 
the light of formal causality.31
Thus far we have illustrated how many neural systems in the brain are plastic; 
i.e., they are able to be modified and to develop according to both intrinsic and 
extrinsic formal determinations. An overwhelming body of empirical evidence 
has substantiated the Hebbian theoretical axiom, “neurons that fire together, wire 
together.” But how and why they fire together remains a disputed point. How is 
the unusual synchrony of diverse cerebral parts causally coordinated? The nature of 
addiction presents us with a case of neuroplasticity that is resistant to reductionist 
interpretations. This resistance motivates our non-reductionist hylomorphic inter-
pretation. What is involved in such an interpretation?
If we take seriously the phenomenon of addiction, we cannot accept proposals 
that entail its theoretical reduction or elimination. To capture the complex nature of 
addiction, we must adopt a holistic understanding of the integrated structure of the 
human person’s psychosomatic unity. We must have an ontology of the human person 
that is able to account for the complex but unified interaction that occurs within 
our psychosomatic constitution. The putative character of the neuroplasticity that is 
caused by addictions reveals that these physiological adaptations are determined, in 
the majority of cases, by the decisions and activities performed by human persons. 
The causal gravity does not find its source in the brain, but in the activities of the 
person, which require the brain, but also can transcend and determine it. I could 
not agree more with Eric LaRock that
The relationship between body and soul on Aquinas’s composite view 
may better be understood as the soul’s capacity to organize neurons (and 
other physical parts of the body) into definite living structures. The higher 
cognitive functions of the soul inform the brain to be definite neural pat-
terns in acts of cognition. If living organization is a metaphysical feature 
of soul exhibited, at least in part, by the activities of neurons, then it is a 
feature associated with but not identical to neurons. The neural machinery 
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of the brain has living organization through the soul, not vice versa. The 
soul holds genuine causal control over the material parts of the material 
component of human nature and hence the rational soul of the human 
composite cannot be a supervenient or derivative, epiphenomenal effect 
of neural activity. Matter depends on form for its actuality, i.e., structure, 
organizing activities, and causal powers. From Aquinas’s perspective, the 
human body exhibits many levels of organization—from elementary con-
stituents of the brain’s nucleons and electrons on up to atoms, molecular 
structures, neurons, and the cerebral excitation associated with higher 
cognition—because of the causal activity of form.32
Interpreting the scientific discoveries of neuroplasticity in terms of formal and 
material causality provides a promising answer to our initial question concerning 
self-determination. But we must also ask, to what extent do human activities deter-
mine the material substrate? How does the activity of formal action, in particular, 
through the operations of our powers, affect our neurophysiology?
Human action is able determine a number of aspects of our psychosomatic 
constitution, including the re-organization of our nervous system in a variety of 
significant and empirically measurable ways. Likewise, just as this latter line of 
philosophical reasoning is complemented by scientific discoveries, so also Karol 
Wojtyła’s account of self-determination, set, as it is, within a Thomistic philosophical 
anthropology, can provide explanations to these questions about the cause of the 
neurological adaptations manifested in the phenomenon of addiction.
A formal act is always received into the recipient according to the mode of the 
recipient, and when that recipient is the brain, it involves the neurological adaptation 
known as neuroplasticity. The repetitious activities that constitute the repertoire of 
human actions also determine the adaptation of different neurological pathways, 
which, in their own way, as material recipients, reinforce the physiological dimen-
sion of the actions of a human person, who is a psychosomatic whole. Addictions as 
dysordered, acquired, autonomic drives are the result of psychic habitus of behavior 
that have also become dense physiologically inlaid neural systems. The outcome is 
that our material body comes to be appetitively inclined towards the same objects 
and actions that we have persistantly chosen to perform over an extended period 
of time. Like our natural appetites for food and water, our body comes to depend 
upon the objects of the acquired autonomic drives. Appetition for such objects 
becomes a constitutional part of a complete human person, who has engrafted 
certain psychosomatic activities or behaviors into their hylomorphic constitution.
A lot more work needs to be done in order to show how hylomorphism would 
account for all the available empirical evidence, as well as how it would to respond 
to various scientific and philosophical objections. These important questions and 
problems cannot be taken up here. This paper only aims to show how a Thomistic 
hylomorphism provides a fruitful way for understanding neuroplasticity in general, 
but especially with respect to particular cases of neuroplasticity, like addiction, that 
clearly result from human acts of self-determination.
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Thus far, our analysis has left two important questions untouched. Why do 
addictions seem to be compulsive, and why are they so difficult to overcome? Can 
philosophy and science offer an integrated answer to why rationally chosen activities 
can become apparently compulsive and irreversible behaviors? This paper cannot 
give a complete answer to these crucial questions, but it will suggest the outline 
of an answer to both of them in the next section. This will require first clarifying 
what an addiction is.
III. Addiction, Self-Determination,  
and Thomistic Philosophical Anthropology
There are a number of competing theories on addiction. This paper’s holistic 
account integrates a number of features found in these different theories of addic-
tion, but it has more in common with the visceral factor perspective of addiction 
than strong emotions, weak-willed, erroneous belief, or brain disease models of ad-
diction.33 Attempting to define and defend our notion of addiction in such a brief 
space would add more confusions than clarification. Instead, we will begin with a 
tentative account of addiction and an explanation of our terms; we will then proceed 
to show how this account fits within a Thomistic philosophical anthropology. For 
the purposes of this paper, addiction will be taken as an acquired dysordered drive; 
this will require a brief explanation.34
Aquinas distinguishes three appetitus or affective appetites, (1) natural concu-
piscence, what we will call drives,35 (2) somatic affections (passio corporalis),36 and 
(3) passions or emotions (passio animalis), what we will often call psychic affections.37 
While Aquinas provides us with a detailed account of passions, his treatment of 
drives and somatic affections is not developed at length. The underdeveloped treat-
ment of the Thomistic doctrine of drives and somatic affections requires a further 
articulation of how these distinct orders are integrated into each other, as well as 
how they are related to practical reason and addiction.
Drives are pre-conscious powers that serve our vegetative powers by activating 
other sensitive powers that bring into consciousness various vital needs for nourish-
ment, sleep, and reproduction. Plants do not have vital drives, but many animals 
do. Drives have the distinctive function of placing telic demands of vital appetites 
into consciousness.38 Drives are the psychological pivot between the nonconscious 
vegetative powers—which formally pattern the autonomic nervous system—and the 
activities of sentient consciousness—which also pattern, and yet are conditioned 
by, various features of our nervous system. Unlike the vegetative powers of growth, 
nutrition, metabolism, and reproduction, which are all ordered towards organic 
vital ends, drives are teleologically ordered towards conscious manifestations via 
various activation channels that bring to the conscious attention of the animal 
some telic demand or need for satiation. The telic specification of a drive does not 
presuppose the animal’s cognition, and it is underdetermined with respect to the 
means of satiation. That is, drives indicate a vital appetitive need, but do not specify 
unconditionally the objects or activities that will satiate the vital appetite.
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Drives are teleologically connected to different activation channels of conscious 
emergence, i.e., they have different avenues for being presented into our conscious 
life. There are two generic spheres of sentient consciousness that are principally 
activated by drives: interoceptive somatic affections and non-observational per-
ceptions by the cogitative power. Somatic affections are as various as aches, pains, 
tickles, and other hedonic bodily affects, many of which pertain to the viscera. 
Cogitative perception involves spontaneous, non-introspective, aspectual, actional, 
and affectional apprehensions and judgments that in turn activate psychic affections 
(e.g., love, concupiscence, aversion, fear). The activation of both somatic affections 
and cogitative apprehensions by drives, make present unspecified telic demands to 
satiate some vital physiological needs. The telic demands communicated through 
visceral affections and cogitative apprehensions are often ambiguous and require a 
hermeneutical investigation before any pragmatic solution can be enacted.39 In other 
cases there is no apparent ambiguity, and the telic demands are non-inferentially 
identified and cogitatively associated with the behavioral activities ordered to 
nourishment, sleep or sexual reproduction, because these activities normatively 
satiate the vital drive. This cogitative association of objects and activities with 
certain vital drives is a learned developmental association and specification of a 
multi-specifiable and poly-satisfied telic demand. Normatively, abdominal somatic 
affections are cogitatively associated with a vital drive for hunger, grogginess and 
fatigue are cogitatively associated with a vital drive for sleep, and cutaneous somatic 
affections in erogenous zones are cogitatively associated with reproductive drives. 
Again, because these cogitative associations are learned specifications of vital drives, 
they can be mistaken. For example, not all abdominal affections are activated 
by a drive for nourishment: some are caused by illness or organ malfunctions 
like appendicitis.
Vegetative powers and the vital drives they activate are autonomic; i.e., they 
are self-regulating and can function without any exogenous or other direct interjec-
tions by conscious human action.40 However, most of them do require maintenance 
by activities carried out through conscious interactions with the environment, like 
acquiring nourishment or reproductive mates. Activated drives are acts of a hu-
man (actus hominis) that episodically recur in various degrees of intensity and are 
normatively satiated by actions that fulfill the specified vital drive. The intensity 
of a vital drive is often proportionate to the somatic affections it activates. When 
one prolongs the satiation of a vital appetite, it often increases the intensity of a 
drive and the activation channels it is teleologically connected with. A protracted 
vital drive for nourishment increases the intensity of the telic demand and activates 
further somatic affections beyond the visceral, like dizziness, headaches, fatigue, etc.
There are natural and acquired drives; some acquired drives are addictions 
because they are dysordered. They are dysordered because they are acquired autonomic 
drives that are both 1) contrary to the ends and proper order of the psychosomatic 
unity of the human person of which they perform a functional part, and 2) upon 
acquisition, they are difficult or arduous to overcome and reform. Addictions should 
be understood according to the psychological model of drives connected with our 
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vegetative powers for nourishment, sleep, and sex. There is also neurophysiological 
evidence to support that addictions co-opt the same behavior reinforcement centers 
that are involved in motivating the activities which satisfy our vital physiological 
needs for nourishment, sleep, and sex.41
This categorization of addiction preserves the truth that we can be morally 
culpable for our addictions and proto-addictions insofar as they deprive us of the 
goods proper to human persons. This account rejects the reductionist theory that 
addictions are brain diseases, although it recognizes and is able to account for why 
many addictions can cause biological and psychological diseases. It also allows us 
to identify a wide variety of activities as addictions, thus going beyond the concep-
tion that we can only be addicted to chemical substances.42 Further, addictions are 
not vices, even though in most cases they are introduced into our psychosomatic 
constitution due to incontinent and vicious activities, especially when the latter 
become psychological habitus of our will and other cognitive or affective faculties. By 
denying that addiction is a vice, we are also contending that addiction falls outside 
of the psychological faculties where we might at first glance believe it is to be found, 
like as an emotion in the concupiscible power.43
Nonetheless it is important to see how this account of addiction preserves the 
fact that most addictions are the result of vice. Recall that our nutritive-reproductive 
drives, the seat of addiction, are the causal sources for many of our somatic affec-
tions and emotions. Hunger, thirst, and somatic exhaustion are all the results of our 
natural autonomic vital drives. These drives are able to cause or activate somatic 
affections and/or the cogitative power’s activation of emotions that attract our con-
scious attention to some telic need for satiation. Natural drives for nourishment 
and sleep are not themselves conscious, but by evoking, say, somatic affections in 
one’s stomach, we become consciously aware of such visceral factors. The activation 
of somatic affections alone, such as aches, pains, itches, vasomotor alterations, etc., 
however, is not sufficient for the conscious identification of them as hunger, thirst, 
etc. This is a further apprehension achieved by the cogitative power, which first 
aspectually or categorically perceives such visceral affections as “hunger,” “thirst,” 
“sexual arousal,” and then evaluates or estimates such affections within a repertoire 
of actional-cum-affectional or axiological judgments as an object to be pragmati-
cally sought or avoided by such-and-such an activity.44 Only after the actional and 
affectional judgment of the cogitative power is there any activation on the part of 
the emotions.45 The emotions react to the evaluation of the actional-cum-affectional 
percept, and this reaction often results in further somatic affections and an emotively 
affected fixation of our cogitative awareness upon our visceral feelings.
This point is important because the cogitative power is also able to partici-
pate in practical reasoning. In fact, in his treatments of practical reason, Aquinas 
often calls it the particular reason, because it provides the singular operable object, 
which is the term of practical reason.46 In this way the cogitative power participates 
in and is integrated within consciousness by apprehending our somatic affections 
and providing the object of our emotions, and, also, through its subordination to 
universal reason, provides us with the minor premise of the practical syllogism. If 
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this subordination is inverted, as occurs in instances where our conscious cogitative 
awareness is distracted by, if not bound to, somatic aches or pains, then the person 
will begin subordinating universal and particular reason to the end of satiating such 
irrepressible visceral factors. Many will recognize this inverted subordination of 
intellect and will to the cogitative judgment and passions of the inner senses as the 
phenomenon of incontinence or akrasia. But what is characteristic of the peculiar 
kind of incontinence found in addictions?
Addictions, as dysordered acquired drives, can, like natural drives, act on our 
visceral affections. Yet they do so without a natural limit. Addictive appetites can 
become so dysordered that they activate vehement somatic affections that signifi-
cantly reduce, if not eliminate, our ability to reason truthfully about practical matters. 
Drew Leder has written especially well on the variety of ways in which the body is 
present or absent. With respect to vehement somatic and visceral affections he writes:
When normal physiology reaches certain functional limits it seizes our at-
tention. We remember the body at times of hunger, thirst, strong excretory 
needs, and the like. It is biologically adaptive that we recall our situation 
at such moments and that their unpleasantness exert a telic demand for 
removal. Cases of weakness, dizziness, or fatigue operate similarly.47
This paper contends that addictions co-opt the system of autonomic drives 
and their activation channels for somatic affections. The vehement presence of a 
somatic affection that one instinctually, or, more precisely, cogitatively associates 
with addictive cravings for certain substances or activities will narrow our conscious 
attention by imperatively directing us towards considering means for satiation. Vehe-
ment somatic affections are unpleasant, if not unbearable. Addictions that activate 
somatic affections of this kind involve reductions in the sphere of human action 
to a limited scope of attention, often dedicated to considering possible satiating 
behaviors. One’s addictive cravings for the associated vicious activities are often 
manifested dynamically at the somatic level as nearly irrepressible visceral affections 
that seem to unconditionally demand satiation. The cogitative evaluation of these 
pains becomes so spontaneous and compulsive that the vehement antecedent passions 
restrict any further cognitive estimation, and there is limited fixation of awareness 
upon a particular object and the means by which to remove it.48 By bringing into 
relief how the dynamism of our cognitive and affective powers of action and activa-
tion are etiologically related, we find a more amplified context for analyzing such 
problems as the apparent, if not real, compulsive character of addictive cravings, 
continence and incontinence, and antecedent and consequent passions.
For the serious addict, the field of evaluation and practical reason becomes 
truncated, and the attendance to right reason is diminished, if not omitted, by the 
telic demands communicated through painful somatic affections.49 Satiating the 
telic demand appears as a good next-to-no-other; i.e., practical reason terminates 
in a judgment that this is good “and nothing else,”50 and the object of the will is 
thereby bound by a disordered rationality to affirm or deny without the ability to 
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attend to alternative goods.51 In such cases, the human person has been reduced 
as a moral being. Human persons should seek goods that are truly ordered within 
the teleological complex of human well-being (eudaimonia). Instead, such addicted 
persons become viciously neurotic, since their ability to reason practically, i.e., to 
consciously attend to alternative ends and means to these ends, is so impaired that 
they only seem able to use reason to subordinate other ends to their addiction and 
to give pseudo-justifications for their narrowing sphere of false goods. In this way, 
addiction can diminish our ability to form true rational evaluations and free-choices. 
However, addictions as such do not eliminate these operations, although addiction 
caused diseases can. In such extreme cases, the human person ceases to be an agent of 
truth and goodness, because the person has become incapable of distinguishing true 
from only apparently true reasons for action, and all of their behavior is determined 
without any voluntary choice with respect to some good.
Finally, we must briefly respond to the question, “why are addictions so dif-
ficult to overcome?” On the side of material causality, we must take note that despite 
the flexible range of neuroplasticity, some adaptations are more rigid than others. It 
may be that some addictions formally and materially determine the psychosomatic 
constitution of the person in such a way that addictions and their cue-dependent 
perceptions by the cogitative power reach points of no return. Cue-dependent cravings 
can be activated years after an addict has been abstinent from their addictive behavior. 
“Successful quitting is thus likely to require a substantial investment in change of 
environment and lifestyle because addiction ‘poisons’ person, places and things as-
sociated with it in the sense of imparting them with the ability to induce craving.”52
Addictions go deep. They infiltrate and affect our basic psychological abilities 
to categorically and axiologically identify patterns of behavior with respect to vari-
ous objects in the world, as well as bind these perceptual cues with neurologically 
seated autonomic drives. These autonomic drives are able to operate independently 
of conscious interjections and can initiate cravings without exogenous stimulation. 
In the case of addictions we have manifest instances that display our autonomic 
drives ability to submit our conscious operations to the telic demands of electro-
chemical equilibria and recurrent schemes of activity proper to the peripheral and 
central nervous systems.
Overcoming addictions requires a proper diagnosis of the problem. One must 
make clear both its etiological root as well as the salient impediments to recovery, 
which, if not removed, can take the unwary sober addict by surprise, who then, often 
enough, relapses. Without a holistic approach to addictions, diagnostic omissions will 
be common, and recovery will only be partial. In other words, there will normally 
be numerous means of treatment for addictions that are required, so as to target and 
reform the numerous ways in which addictions affect us. Pharmacological treatments 
of addictions are often helpful and sometimes essential. Nevertheless, treatment of 
addiction requires more than pharmacological inhibitions, it also requires re-forming 
our perceptual repertoire of categorical and actional percepts or cues that stimulate 
cravings within an addict’s acquired drives. This is difficult because such perceptions 
are integrated into our very way of life. To reform the matter, we must also reform 
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the form, and this requires changing one’s life by re-ordaining the values and goods 
that one chooses to seek by placing them within their proper teleological order.53 
In many cases it also requires uncovering and correcting the initial impetus that led 
to and started their addictive behavior in the first place.
Addicts, like all human persons, are dependent rational animals and the 
likelihood of recovery is increased through human solidarity in a community 
that acknowledges a true teleological order of values and goods. Addicts have dug 
themselves into a pit; without the help of family, friends, and a community who 
participate in a common set of goods, the addict is unlikely to find the social and 
psychological resources that are a necessary and essential complement to pharmaco-
logical treatments. We repeat, to reform the matter, one must also reform the form. 
As much as the neurological and psychological mutually condition each other, the 
psychological and the social also mutually condition one another. Nonetheless, even 
with the best treatment resources available, recovery is very difficult, and success is 
rarely achieved in extreme cases of addiction.
IV. Addiction and Grace
We hope that this paper has made clear a few of the ways that a Thomistic hylo-
morphic ontology of the human person provides a robust and unified philosophical 
framework for analyzing the complex interlocking causal orders involved in the moral 
psychology of human action, self-determination, addiction, and neural plasticity, and 
offers a promising alternative to dualism or reductive physicalism. Nevertheless, this 
integrated discussion of how Thomistic philosophical anthropology and neuroscience 
are related to addiction would not be complete without mentioning how the religious 
sphere offers us some hope in extreme cases of addiction. In addition to philosophical 
analysis, Thomism also provides us with a powerful theological doctrine on the grace 
that perfects nature, even in its most deteriorated and dejected forms.54 The grace 
of Christ is a free gift, which is needed by us all, but it is needed in a special way for 
those suffering from addictions. Philosophy and science only bring us so far, and 
both remain open to theological insight and guidance. Without the intervention of 
Divine grace, some humans would never be able to achieve even the most minimal 
natural ends. We cannot expect it, but God can enter in and restore the horizon of 
human practical reason and action by returning it to its natural course.
We must also recognize that addictions are often the result of sin. Even though 
not all addictions are caused by evil actions and vice, most are. Inasmuch as addic-
tions are related to sin, they can and do disorder us with respect to our supernatural 
end. The depravity of the objects and activities which such persons have chosen, 
have corrupted not only their practical reasoning and emotions; they have also infil-
trated their bodies, rendering entire persons deprived of their full natural vitality. It 
is through their evil choices that their entire being, as psychosomatic, has taken on 
the characteristic privations that are so many manifestations of evil. This is especially 
so in the case of addictions that have caused diseases, either physiological, like liver 
disease, or psychological, like psychosis.
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Despite such dire circumstances, we must recognize that not all of these in-
capacities are absolute. Where human optimism would be foolhardy, one’s hope in 
Christ will not be in vain. Grace is able to give life again to an otherwise operationally 
diminished practical reason. Where sin has abounded, grace is able to abound even 
more. Dependent rational animals are able to find solace in suffering and liberty in 
the grace of Christ, which is most especially given to us through living within the 
Ecclesia and partaking of Her sacraments. Through charity, addicts are able to receive 
the infused virtues, which, though they do not necessarily remove the acquired in-
clinations towards objects of evil, they do miraculously give one the ability to avoid 
such temptations.55 Even with grace, overcoming an addiction remains an upward 
battle with a vector well beyond the addict’s deficient natural capacities. But such 
is the vector of Calvary for us all. And sometimes, the way of the cross is only taken 
up because one has finally come to see that truly it is His yoke that is easy, and that 
such burdens, by his grace alone, are able to become light.56
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and Lonergan’s account of neural demand functions in Insight, chap.6.
 39. Cf. Drew Leder, The Absent Body, 77–78ff.
 40. Though causally coordinated with the autonomic nervous system in a number of 
respects, these autonomic psychological powers should not be identified with the autonomic 
nervous system.
 41. Cf. George Loewenstein, “Out of control: Visceral Influences on Behavior” Organi-
zational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 65 (1996): 272–292 and, eadem, “A Visceral 
Account of Addiction.”
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 42. Substance based addictions like nicotine, alcohol, and cocaine were thought to be 
normative, but recently the notion of addiction has been, and I believe should be, extended to 
include gambling, aberrant sexual behavior, pornography, cutting, exercise, video games, T.V. 
watching, internet browsing, and perhaps even eating disorders such as anorexia or bulimia. 
Though the latter are certainly kinds of behavioral disorders, it is not clear if they should 
be classified as addictions. Concerning the distinction between substance and behavioral 
addictions, and its potential deficiencies see Elster, Strong Feelings, 58; Foddy and Savulescu 
“A Liberal Account of Addiction,” passim.
 43. There are extreme instances where addictions are involuntarily acquired, such as 
when the consumption of addictive substances is forced upon victims. This unfortunately 
occurs too frequently in cases of sex slave prostitution and as a means of torture. Also, many 
addicts who are trying to quit no longer desire, i.e., have an emotional attraction to the 
addictive substance or activity, yet the addict still has a strong drive or inclination for it. 
These are just a few of the many reasons why we have not placed the locus of addiction in 
the concupiscible power.
 44. Cf. DV 10.5; ST I.78.4; In DA II.13. In these passages Aquinas makes it clear that 
the proper object of the cogitative power is a singular per accidens sensible which is neither the 
colored, moving, shaped magnitude of per se proper and common sensibles, but is this man, 
which happens to be per se sensible as white, a certain shaped magnitude, and in motion. 
Essentially speaking, the proper object of the cogitative power is a singular intention. These 
intentions admit of a division into aspectual, actional, and affectional intentions, which are 
taken up in detail in the forthcoming paper, “Perception and the Vis Cogitativa: A Thomistic 
Analysis of Aspectual, Actional, and Affectional Percepts.”
 45. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent. 24.2.1; ad2; In III Sent., 17.1.1.2ad 2; In IV Sent. 
49.2.2; ST I.81.3 (esp. ad.2); ST I-II.22.2; DSC 9; DQVC I.4. There are a number of recent 
articles and books that treat this feature of the cogitative power and the object of the pas-
sions. My account differs considerably with Robert Miner, but is quite similar to the doctrine 
expressed by Diana Cates and Michael Stock. See: Diana Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions: A 
Religious-Ethical Inquiry (Georgetown University Press, 2009); Peter King, “Aquinas on the 
Passions” in Aquinas’s Moral Theory, ed. Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (Cornell 
University Press, 1998), 101–132; Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009); Michael Stock, “Sense Consciousness According to St. Thomas” The 
Thomist 21.4 (1958): 415–486.
 46. “Ratio autem practica quedam est uniuersalis et quedam particularis (universalis 
quidem sicut que dicit quod oportet talem tale agere, sicut quod oportet filium honorare par-
entem; ratio autem particularis, quod hoc quidem tale et ego talis, puta quod ego filius hunc 
honorem nunc debeo exhibere parenti)” In DA III. 10 (434a16) (Leonine, 251:128–133); “ut 
sic fiat quidam syllogismus cuius maior sit universalis quae est sententia mentis, minor autem 
singularis quae est apprehensio particularis rationis, conclusio vero electio singularis operis, 
ut patet per id quod habertur in III De anima.” DV 10.5, (Leonine, 309:94–99). Both in his 
commentary on this text from the De Anima and in De Veritate, Aquinas distributes practical 
reason into the “universal reason” and the “particular reason,” which is one of many ways in 
which Aquinas distinguishes the intellect from the cogitative power. Cf. Aquinas, ST I.81.3; 
86.1; II-II. 49.2; 5; In VI Ethics, lt. 1, n. 1123; lt. 7 nn. 1213–1215; lt. 9, nn. 1247–1256.
 47. Drew Leder, The Absent Body, 84.
 48. Cf. Aquinas, De Malo 3.4; ST I-II. 77.6.
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 49. Addictions range in intensity throughout their development just as psychic habitus 
do. Likewise, just as natural appetites for nourishment, sleep and sex can be resisted and 
ignored by various means, so too with acquired proto-addictions, like excessive acquired 
drives for exercise, caffeine, and social stimulation or solitude. Just as one can quell hunger 
or a sexual urge, we can ignore or put out of mind appetitive promptings. We can do this 
prudently or imprudently. Dysorder with respect to these appetites’ appropriate function is 
revealed when we are no longer able to do this with relative ease. It should be noted, however, 
that moderately intense drives in one’s acquired appetites for exercise or hygiene could be 
rationally ordered and so be signs of virtue, not vice, and especially not of disease.
 50. Cf. Steve Jensen, “The Error of the Passions,” The Thomist 73 (2009): 349–79.
 51. Even if an addictive appetite is evaluated as one to be avoided, the somatic affec-
tions caused by the addictive appetites might manifest a vehement need and telic demand 
to overcome the pain, which is often physiologically debilitating, recurrent and sometimes 
incapacitating if avoided and not satiated. Such extreme cases of addiction can often further 
result in diseases that are caused by addictions.
 52. Elster, Strong Feelings, 245.
 53. This is difficult to achieve, especially in the absence of the support provided by friends 
and family. In Dependent Rational Animals, Alasdair MacIntyre discusses how solidarity and 
communities are needed for human beings to practice the virtues and for ordering their lives 
towards their proper ends. The importance of solidarity has proved to be especially fruitful 
for treating addictions, as has been demonstrated by the success of groups like AA.
 54. For Aquinas’s principal treatment of grace, see ST I-II. 109–114. He then takes up 
the nature of grace throughout the rest of the Summa theologiae, but especially in his extended 
treatments of the theological virtues, Christology, and sacramental theology.
 55. “Those emotions that incline us towards evil are not completely removed either 
through acquired or through infused virtue, except, maybe, by a miracle. For the struggle of 
the flesh against the spirit always remains, even when we possess moral virtue. St Paul says 
about this in Galatians, 5:17 ‘The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.’ 
But emotions of this sort are modified both by acquired and by infused virtues, so that we are 
not stirred by them in an unrestrained way. However, (i) acquired virtue achieves this in one 
way and (ii) infused virtue in another. (i) For acquired virtue is effective to the extent that the 
struggle is felt less. This comes about from its own particular cause: when someone becomes 
accustomed to virtue through repeated actions, they then become unaccustomed to obey 
those emotions, and accustomed to resist them. The consequence of this is that they feel less 
troubled by them. (ii) Infused virtue, by contrast, is effective to the extent that even if emotions 
of this sort are felt, they do not take control. For infused virtue means that we refrain totally 
from obeying sinful desires, and as long as it remains in us, we do so unfailingly. (Acquired 
virtue can fail in this way, but rarely, in the way that all natural inclinations occasionally let 
us down.)” Thomas Aquinas, On the Virtues in Common, 10 ad14, in Disputed Questions on 
the Virtues, ed., and trans., E. M. Atkins (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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